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Preserving Your Right To Parent: The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina Addresses Unmarried Fathers’ Due Process Rights in 
In Re Adoption of S.D.W.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The prototypical nuclear family is on the decline.1 Between forty 
and fifty percent of marriages end in divorce,2 and more than forty 
percent of all births in the United States are to unmarried women.3 
Yet, courts still regard marriage as “[t]he most effective protection of 
[a] father’s opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.”4 It 
was not until the early 1970s that the United States Supreme Court 
officially recognized that unmarried fathers had parental rights 
protected under the Constitution.5 Since the 1970s, family structures 
have changed rapidly,6 and as a result, the Supreme Court has had to 
refine its position on biological fathers’ rights. It is now settled law 
that biological fathers have a due process right to notice of any 
adoption proceeding and may withhold consent to the adoption under 
certain circumstances.7 
 
 *  © 2015 Erin E. Gibbs. 
 1. See Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred By Law: The Disappearance of the Traditional 
Family and Law’s Refusal To Let It Go, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 125, 128–29 (2004). 
 2. Marriage & Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2014), http://www.apa.org/topics
/divorce/ [http://perma.cc/W3ZU-JTCE]. 
 3. Unmarried Childbearing, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-
childbearing.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/C7K4-9PK9]. 
 4. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983). 
 5. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that an unmarried father 
was denied due process of law under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when the state took his children from his custody after the death of their 
mother because of a statutory scheme that excluded unmarried fathers from the definition 
of “parent”). 
 6. See generally TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. CHI., CHANGES 
IN FAMILY STRUCTURE, FAMILY VALUES, AND POLITICS, 1972–2006 (2008), http://
publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/documents/scrt/sc53%20changes%20in%20family%20structur
e,%20family%20values,%20and%20politics,%201972-2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QHK-7GW8] 
(describing how “[f]amily structure and family values have undergone tremendous 
changes over the last generation”). 
 7. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267–68 (holding that a putative father was not entitled 
to notice under the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401 (1979) (holding that a New York 
law that allowed natural mothers but not fathers to block an adoption by withholding 
consent violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Stanley, 405 
U.S. at 645 (holding that an unmarried father was denied due process of law under the 
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What happens when an unmarried biological father is unaware 
that he has become a father until after the adoption is already in 
progress, however, is anything but clear. Should the father’s consent 
be required before the adoption can be finalized? Does not knowing 
about the child excuse a putative father’s noninvolvement, or should 
he bear the responsibility for keeping track of any children he may 
have fathered? Complicating the matter even further is the fact that 
some women will either actively thwart a father’s attempts to develop 
a relationship with his child or outright lie about the child’s existence 
and the father’s identity.8 
Many states have not yet adequately addressed these realities, 
either through legislation or through the courts,9 and North Carolina 
is no exception. In June 2014, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
was forced to confront these issues in In re Adoption of S.D.W. 
(“S.D.W.”).10 In S.D.W., after hiding her pregnancy from her former 
paramour, a woman placed her child for adoption and actively 
misrepresented the father’s identity both on an affidavit of parentage 
and to the adoption agency.11 When the father later found out about 
the child, he attempted to intervene in the adoption proceeding, but a 
trial court ruled that his consent was not required to proceed under 
North Carolina law.12 A long and expensive13 legal battle ensued, and 
 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the state took his children 
from his custody after the death of their mother because of a statutory scheme that 
excluded unmarried fathers from the definition of “parent”). But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (holding that the consent of an unmarried father who had never 
sought actual or legal custody of his child was not required for adoption). 
 8. See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1205 (Kan. 2008) (Nuss, J., 
dissenting) (discussing a biological father’s consent to adoption where the biological 
mother lied about having had an abortion); In re Baby Boy K, 546 N.W.2d 86, 88 (S.D. 
1996) (discussing an affidavit where a biological mother admitted to lying about the 
identity of the child’s biological father); Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100–01 
(N.Y. 1992) (discussing a biological mother who did not inform the biological father of the 
pregnancy or birth until ten months after the adoption was finalized). 
 9. See, e.g., Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How To Determine 
When Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 
153, 175 (2006) (“Although in the last ten years many state legislatures have devised 
evermore explicit schemes to clearly and timely sort the ‘thwarted father’ with the right to 
withhold consent from the ‘pop-up pop’ who has forfeited his opportunity interest in a 
relationship with his child, much uncertainty remains.”). 
 10. 367 N.C. 386, 758 S.E.2d 374 (2014). 
 11. Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376. 
 12. Id. at 390–91, 758 S.E.2d at 377–78. 
 13. The father, Gregory Johns, claimed to have spent over $100,000 on legal fees, well 
before his case even made it before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See Alyssa 
Rosenberg, Dad Spends Father’s Day Alone, with Hopes To Meet His Son, WWAY (June 16, 
2013), http://www.wwaytv3.com/2013/06/16/dad-spends-fathers-day-alone-hopes-to-meet-his-
son [http://perma.cc/QX97-2TU5]. 
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eventually, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the trial 
court’s determination that the father’s constitutional rights were not 
violated.14 While the facts in this case are unique and, to some extent, 
sensational, the court’s decision could nonetheless have broad 
implications for future adoptions throughout North Carolina. 
This Recent Development contends that S.D.W. was wrongly 
decided, but not just for the reasons the dissent identifies. Part I 
begins by laying out the constitutional and statutory frameworks for 
biological fathers’ rights in adoptions in North Carolina. Part II then 
examines S.D.W. in detail, ultimately concluding that it was wrongly 
decided. Part III addresses both the majority’s and the dissent’s 
concerns, as well as certain implications of the court’s decision that 
both opinions fail to contemplate. Finally, Part IV recommends a new 
statutory scheme that would more effectively handle adoption 
placements—in cases both similar to and dissimilar to S.D.W.—in the 
future. 
I.  CONTEXTUALIZING THE DEBATE—THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR BIOLOGICAL FATHERS AND 
ADOPTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 
A. The Constitutional Framework 
Although nearly half of all births in the United States are now to 
unmarried women,15 less than fifty years ago, the legal rights and 
obligations of fathers and children were almost exclusively tied to 
marriage.16 In the early twentieth century, marriage was the prevailing 
way for parents to take responsibility for their children.17 In fact, at 
common law, nonmarital children were considered filius nullius—the 
children of no one.18 Nonmarital children did not have the same 
inheritance rights as marital children, and wrongful death claims and 
 
 14. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381. 
 15. See CDC, supra note 3. 
 16. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983) (“The most effective protection of 
the putative father’s opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is provided by the 
laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequences.”). 
 17. See David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in 
the United States Since 1960, at 6 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working 
Paper No. RWP04-008, 2004), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers
/citation.aspx?PubId=2069&type=WPN [http://perma.cc/G4H8-KXXD] (“In 1960 most 
men and women who engaged in premarital sex assumed that if the woman became 
pregnant they would marry and raise the child together. As a result, premarital 
pregnancies were fairly common, but premarital births were rare.”). 
 18. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 350 (2011). 
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government benefits relating to the death of a parent were available 
only to marital children.19 It was not until 1968 that the United States 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the rights of nonmarital children 
under the Equal Protection Clause,20 prompting a series of opinions 
throughout the 1970s that eliminated distinctions between marital and 
nonmarital children.21 
Similarly, unmarried fathers had limited rights in regard to child 
rearing until the 1970s. Before 1972, in a vast majority of states, an 
unwed mother had the sole authority to place a child for adoption 
with no input from the child’s father required.22 However, in 1972, the 
Supreme Court extended constitutional protections to unmarried 
biological fathers for the first time,23 affirming that “[t]he right[] to 
conceive and to raise one’s children”24 is a “basic civil right[].”25 Over 
the next several years, coinciding with the rapid rise in availability of 
technology that could easily and accurately identify a biological link 
between father and child,26 the Supreme Court completely 
transformed the way courts view the constitutional rights of biological 
fathers.27 This development was grounded in the Due Process and 
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 
This transformation started in 1972 with Stanley v. Illinois.29 In 
Stanley, the Court held that an unmarried father who was raising his 
children had a due process right to a hearing on parental fitness 
before the state could take the children from his custody.30 The Court 
stopped short, however, of extending those rights to biological fathers 
 
 19. See id. at 350–51. 
 20. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“We start from the premise that 
illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being. 
They are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
 21. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974) (invalidating a blanket 
ban on nonmarital children receiving social security disability benefits); N.J. Welfare 
Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973) (striking down a statute denying welfare 
benefits to nonmarital children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 
(1972) (overturning a law denying worker’s compensation benefits to unacknowledged 
nonmarital children). 
 22. See Robert Rausch, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption Process, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 85, 85 (1980). 
 23. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).  
 24. Id. at 651.  
 25. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).  
 26. See Oren, supra note 9, at 154. 
 27. See id. at 154–55. 
 28. See supra note 7. 
 29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 30. See id. at 658. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 723 (2016) 
2015] UNMARRIED FATHERS' RIGHT TO PARENT 727 
who had not played a part in raising their children.31 Later, in 1978, 
the Court clarified in Quilloin v. Walcott32 that fathers do not have a 
due process right to consent to or veto an adoption when they have 
failed to take actual or legal custody of the child.33 In that case, the 
Court allowed a stepfather to adopt a child over the biological 
father’s objections because it was in the child’s best interest.34 Even 
though the father in Quilloin did have a relationship with his child—
visiting with the child and giving gifts on occasion35—he had “never 
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.”36 
The following year, the Supreme Court went even further, 
declaring that a New York statute giving the right to consent to an 
adoption to unwed mothers but not to unwed fathers, regardless of 
their actual involvement with the child, violated the Constitution.37 In 
Caban v. Mohammed38 the Court held that, because the children had 
previously lived with their father and because he had maintained 
regular contact with them,39 he was similarly situated to the children’s 
mother.40 The statute allowing an adoption to proceed without his 
consent was thus overturned as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.41 
Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson,42 the Court clarified that biological 
fathers do have an incipient interest in raising their children, noting 
that “[biology] offers the natural father an opportunity that no other 
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.”43 The 
Court then went on to say that a father who “grasps that opportunity 
and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s 
future . . . may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship[,]”44 
but that when “he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 33. Id. at 255. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 251. 
 36. Id. at 256. 
 37. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). 
 38. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 39. See id. at 382–83. 
 40. See id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 41. See id. at 394 (majority opinion). 
 42. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 43. Id. at 262. 
 44. Id. 
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automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the 
child’s best interests lie.”45 
Lehr established that a putative father’s due process rights are 
layered. First, he has an “inchoate” interest in developing a 
relationship with his child,46 but by itself, “the mere existence of a 
biological link does not merit . . . constitutional protection.”47 Instead, 
the biological father’s inchoate interest must be accompanied by an 
active parenting effort and/or financial support because “[t]he 
importance of the familial relationship . . . stems from the emotional 
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.”48 So 
while a putative father’s inchoate interest must be protected, that 
interest may be forfeited if he fails to avail himself of the opportunity 
biology has afforded him.49 Procedurally, this amounts to an 
entitlement to notice and the right to withhold consent to an adoption 
proceeding, but again, that right is not absolute.50 The right hinges not 
only on biology, but also on the father having taken responsibility for 
and actively participated in a child’s life.51 Still, the dividing line 
between an active and involved father who has earned constitutional 
protection of his rights and an uninvolved father who has forfeited his 
rights remains unclear. 
North Carolina courts have followed the Supreme Court’s 
application of Lehr.52 Not only is the state bound by the Federal 
Constitution, but the North Carolina Constitution’s law of the land 
clause53 has been interpreted as the state’s equivalent of the Due 
Process Clause.54 State courts’ interpretation of biological fathers’ 
rights within the North Carolina Constitution has been largely 
indistinguishable from federal courts’ interpretations of the analogous 
clauses under the United States Constitution.55 Still, what constitutes 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 248. 
 47. Id. at 261. 
 48. Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
844 (1977)). 
 49. See id. at 250–51. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 250–51, 262. 
 52. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 251, 435 S.E.2d 352, 354 
(1993) (asserting that constitutional rights to due process do not “spring full-blown from 
the biological connection” (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262)). 
 53. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
 54. City of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C. App. 1, 44, 665 S.E.2d 103, 133 (2008). 
 55. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 392, 758 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2014) 
(“Because Johns has not argued that the Law of the Land Clause of the Constitution of 
North Carolina and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States are to 
be interpreted differently here, we will not distinguish between them in our analysis.”). 
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active participation in a child’s life—in particular a very young child’s 
life—is hard to define, and the responsibility of unwitting fathers 
proves even harder to define. 
B. The Statutory Framework 
The federal and state constitutions provide only a loose 
framework for biological fathers’ rights. States are left to fill in the 
blanks for themselves when it comes to providing a workable 
statutory scheme for adoptions that, among other things, protects the 
due process rights of unmarried fathers.56 The statutes should not 
exclude too many responsible fathers from their protection,57 but 
beyond that, the only requirement for a statutory scheme to meet 
bare-minimum procedural requirements under the Constitution after 
Lehr is that whatever criteria an interested putative father must meet 
in order to qualify for an entitlement to notice must not be “beyond 
[his] control.”58 
With regard to notice and consent in adoption proceedings, 
North Carolina’s statute gives a virtual veto power over an adoption 
to several categories of people.59 Those whose consent is required 
before an adoption can proceed include the birth mother;60 the birth 
mother’s husband61 or very recent ex-husband;62 any man who has 
attempted to marry the mother before the child’s birth;63 and any man 
who has otherwise legitimated the child, taken on an obligation of 
support for the child, or accepted the child into his home and held 
himself out as the child’s father before the filing of the adoption 
petition.64 Notably, the statutes do not require that a man in the 
above-mentioned categories also be the biological father of the child 
in question.65 Additionally, even when a putative father is entitled to 
notice because of his inclusion in one of these categories and is 
required to give consent to the adoption proceeding, if he fails to 
 
 56. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (“Subject to certain 
constitutional guarantees, ‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been 
regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.’ ” (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 
393, 404 (1975) (internal citation omitted)). 
 57. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601 (2013). 
 60. § 48-3-601(2)(a). 
 61. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(1). 
 62. Id. 
 63. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(2). 
 64. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3)–(5). 
 65. § 48-3-601(2)(b). 
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respond to the notice in a timely manner, his consent will no longer 
be required.66 
There are glaring omissions in North Carolina’s statutes. The 
statutory framework does not address fathers who are actively 
thwarted from establishing relationships with their children, nor does 
it protect fathers who may be interested but are unaware that they 
have fathered children. Moreover, the statutes do not seem to 
recognize the possibility of a mother having purposefully lied or 
misrepresented the identity of the child’s father. Though the statutes 
do not confront these scenarios, they are unfortunate realities—
realities that the court faced in S.D.W. and will likely have to face 
again in the future. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING IN RE ADOPTION OF S.D.W. 
A. Factual Background and Procedural History 
The factual record in S.D.W. describes an unfortunate situation 
and a close call. In S.D.W., Laura Welker and Gregory Johns became 
parents as a result of their “mostly physical”67 relationship, which 
lasted from May 2009 until February or March 2010.68 During that 
time period, the two had sex between ten and twenty times a week.69 
Johns was aware that Welker was fertile—she already had a child who 
was living with her mother.70 During the summer of 2009, Welker 
once again became pregnant and notified Johns.71 They mutually 
decided that Welker would have an abortion.72 After the pregnancy 
was terminated, Johns testified that Welker informed him she was 
using another form of birth control that he identified as either a 
patch—though he had never seen a patch on her body despite having 
sex with her more than ten times a week—or an “IUD band.”73 
Though Johns was inadequately informed about the birth control 
methods they were using, he and Welker continued to have sex 
regularly and without condoms for the next several months.74 
 
 66. Id. § 48-3-603(a)(7)–(8). 
 67. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 387, 758 S.E.2d 374, 375 (2014). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 375–76. 
 71. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 376. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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Welker eventually cut contact with Johns in March of 2010,75 at 
which point she was, unbeknownst to Johns, already pregnant with his 
baby. Welker gave birth on October 10, 2010, and the next day, filed 
an affidavit of parentage, misnaming the father as “Gregory Thomas 
James” instead of “Gregory Joseph Johns” and listing no last known 
address.76 She then relinquished custody of the newborn to an 
adoption agency called Christian Adoption Services.77 The adoption 
agency placed the child with his prospective adoptive parents, 
Benjamin and Heather Jones, on October 12, 2010, a mere two days 
after his birth.78 Two weeks later, on October 27, Welker signed a 
form for the adoption agency once again misidentifying Gregory 
Johns as “Gregory Thomas James.”79 
On November 2, 2010, the Joneses filed a petition to legally 
adopt the child, while the agency, relying on the false name Welker 
had given, set out to find and notify Johns.80 When the agency 
predictably failed to find Johns, the adoption proceeding was stayed,81 
and the agency filed a motion to terminate the father’s parental rights 
on November 16, 2010.82 Meanwhile, on November 26, 2010, a mere 
six weeks after giving birth, Welker visited Johns on his birthday and 
engaged in sexual intercourse.83 Even then, she still declined to 
inform him of the child he had fathered.84 Nonetheless, by late April 
of 2011, Johns finally learned that Welker had given birth.85 After 
hearing the news from an acquaintance, Johns confronted Welker on 
April 25, 2011, and she eventually admitted that she had indeed given 
birth to a son, Johns’s biological child, and had placed him for 
adoption.86 
Johns expressed his intent to obtain custody of the baby, leading 
Welker to confess Johns’s true identity to the adoption agency.87 
Subsequently, counsel for the adoption agency voluntarily dismissed 
its action to terminate parental rights on May 2, 2011. As a result, the 
court removed the temporary stay on the adoption proceeding, and 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
 77. Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376 (majority opinion). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 40–41 (2013). 
 83. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376. 
 86. Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376 (majority opinion). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 723 (2016) 
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three days later, the Joneses gave notice of their intention to proceed 
with the adoption.88 Johns retained counsel and, after several months 
of back and forth, on January 6, 2012, a district court judge held that 
North Carolina’s adoption statutes did not require Johns’s consent to 
the adoption and denied all his motions, thereby allowing the 
adoption to move forward.89 
The case then moved to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
which held that the district court judge correctly interpreted North 
Carolina’s statutes as not requiring Johns’s consent.90 The court held 
that, even though Johns did not know of his child’s existence until 
after the adoption petition was filed, his consent was not required by 
statute because he had not sought to establish a relationship with the 
child prior to its filing.91 However, the court held that: 
[A] biological father who, prior to the filing of the petition was 
unaware that the mother was pregnant and had no reason to 
know, promptly takes steps to assume parental responsibility 
upon discovering the existence of the child, has developed a 
constitutionally protected interest sufficient to require his 
consent where the adoption proceeding is still pending.92 
The court explained that, even though his consent was not required 
by statute, if the facts were as Johns described them, his constitutional 
due process rights were violated when the adoption was allowed to 
proceed despite his objections.93 The court then remanded the case 
for further factual determinations.94 
B. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Analysis 
When the case made its way to the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, the court clarified the applicable legal standard as that 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr.95 Johns 
conceded that he did not fit the statute’s definition of a responsible 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 388–90, 758 S.E.2d at 376–77.  
 90. In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 43 (2013). 
 91. Id. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 50 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (2013)). 
 92. In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added). 
 93. See id. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 44.  
 94. See id. 
 95. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 391–92, 758 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2014); 
see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983) (noting that statutes that “omit 
many responsible fathers” and have qualifications for notice that are “beyond the control 
of an interested putative father” are procedurally inadequate). 
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parent entitled to notice,96 and he did not challenge the statute’s 
validity.97 Accordingly, the only plausible basis for his due process 
claim was the possibility that the statutory qualifications for notice 
were “beyond his control.”98 The court then set about applying this 
exceptionally vague standard to the facts at hand.99 Unsurprisingly, 
the seven justices did not agree.100 
Justice Edmunds, writing for the majority, acknowledged 
Welker’s behavior as “troubling,”101 but condemned Johns’s behavior 
as well.102 Welker not only provided a false name, thereby 
“obstructing official efforts to locate the father,”103 she also visited 
Johns less than two months after giving birth and kept the news of 
their child to herself.104 Still, Justice Edmunds insisted that while 
Welker’s behavior was less than admirable, nothing she did put Johns 
in the position where meeting the qualifications for notice under the 
statute were no longer within his control.105 Instead, the majority 
blamed the fact that Johns did not qualify for notice on his 
“incuriosity and disinterest.”106 
The majority focused heavily on Johns’s irresponsibility with 
regard to birth control. Though the court stopped short of 
implementing a rule saying that the act of having sex is enough to put 
a man on notice that he has fathered a child,107 the majority still 
faulted Johns for not finding out about his child sooner. Johns knew 
that Welker was fertile because he was aware that she had had a child 
before they met,108 and he had already impregnated her once.109 But 
even after the abortion, Johns took on no additional responsibility for 
birth control.110 Johns assumed Welker’s birth control would be 
 
 96. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 394–95, 758 S.E.2d at 380; see also supra 
notes 59–66 and accompanying text for a list of the categories of people entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to consent before an adoption proceeding begins.  
 97. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 394, 758 S.E.2d at 380; see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (2013).  
 98. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983)). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.  
 101. Id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.  
 106. Id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380.  
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380–81. 
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effective, despite the fact that her birth control had already failed 
once during their relationship,111 and he did not use condoms, even 
after the abortion.112 
Moreover, when Johns finally did confront Welker in April of 
2011, she eventually admitted to having given birth to his child.113 The 
majority interpreted this as evidence that the burden on Johns to find 
out that Welker had been pregnant was low—all he had to do was 
ask.114 Meanwhile, while Johns was oblivious to his son’s existence, 
S.D.W. had already been living with and bonding with his prospective 
adoptive parents, the Joneses.115 To the majority, Johns’s passivity 
amounted to his having had the opportunity to establish himself as a 
responsible father but failing to grasp it.116 Accordingly, the court held 
that he did not have a liberty interest in developing a relationship 
with his child, and therefore allowing an adoption to move forward 
without his consent was not a violation of his due process rights.117 
Three justices, however, saw it differently. Writing for the 
dissent, Justice Jackson chastised the majority for failing to give 
sufficient deference to a biological father’s “inchoate” interest, 
described in Lehr.118 Instead of narrowly focusing on whether 
opportunity for notice was “beyond [his] control,”119 the dissent 
focused on whether Johns was afforded sufficient opportunities to 
protect his inchoate interest in developing a relationship with his child 
and concluded that he was not.120 Though the dissent agreed with the 
majority’s retelling of the facts of the case, in Justice Jackson’s 
reasoning, several of the facts the majority cited actually undermined 
its ultimate conclusion.121 The dissent identified and rebutted four of 
the reasons the majority gave for ruling against Johns.122 
First, with regard to the use of birth control in S.D.W. and its 
implications, the dissent posited that the majority’s position on birth 
control essentially requires couples to use “multiple, redundant forms 
of contraception or risk losing any rights [the putative father] might 
 
 111. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376. 
 112. Id. (describing Johns’s testimony about Welker’s birth control methods). 
 113. Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 114. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 381 (majority opinion). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 397, 758 S.E.2d at 381(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 394, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248, 263–64 (1983)). 
 120. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
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have to raise and care for any children that result from this 
(protected) sexual activity.”123 Because Welker told Johns that she 
was on birth control, the dissent argued, the majority opinion 
effectively requires men to wear condoms in addition to any other 
forms of birth control the couple might be using. 
Second, the majority took the fact that Johns had already 
impregnated Welker once before and that he was involved in her 
decision to have an abortion as evidence that he knew that she was 
fertile.124 The dissent, however, interpreted this to mean that Johns 
had no reason to believe that Welker would hide any future 
pregnancies from him.125 Given that history, the dissent saw no reason 
that Johns should have had “to remain in contact with Welker and 
affirmatively inquire whether she was pregnant with his child, even 
after their romantic relationship ended.”126 
Third, instead of focusing on Johns’s responsibility to inquire 
about Welker’s pregnancy, the dissent emphasized the relative ease 
with which Welker could have notified Johns.127 His contact 
information had not changed at all during the pregnancy or after the 
birth of the child. In fact, Johns lived in the same apartment he had 
lived in for several years, the same place where Welker had visited 
him more than a hundred times.128 He also kept both the same home 
and cell phone numbers.129 
Finally, even though Welker could have easily contacted Johns, 
she chose to deceive him—and others—instead.130 Welker told the 
adoption agency that she did not know the address or phone number 
of the father and that she had no way to contact him,131 even though 
Johns had neither moved nor changed his number.132 Welker also 
misidentified Johns on the affidavit of parentage and the adoption 
agency forms133 and failed to list him on the child’s birth certificate.134 
Additionally, Welker chose not to tell Johns about the pregnancy or 
the birth, even though they slept together just a few weeks after 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion). 
 125. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 398–99, 758 S.E.2d at 382. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383. 
 131. See In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2013). 
 132. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 398–99, 758 S.E.2d at 382. 
 133. See id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383. 
 134. See id. 
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Welker gave birth.135 And when Johns eventually did confront her 
directly, she initially denied that the baby was his before ultimately 
relenting and admitting that he was, in fact, the father.136 In the 
dissent’s eyes, these four factors, taken together, amounted to no 
meaningful opportunity for Johns to develop his relationship with his 
child and acquire an entitlement to notice to the adoption under the 
statutes. Therefore, he did not relinquish his constitutional right to 
develop a relationship with his child, and the adoption should not 
have proceeded without his consent. 
III.  WHERE THE COURT WENT WRONG 
While both the majority and dissent raise valid points, this 
Recent Development takes the position that the dissent was correct: 
Johns’s missed opportunity to develop a relationship with his son was 
beyond his control.137 That he did not know of his son’s existence until 
the child had already been placed with his adoptive family138 meant 
that Johns had no meaningful opportunity to develop a relationship 
with his son. Rather, Johns could not step up as a father because 
Welker did not inform him of his son’s existence. Once he learned of 
his son, he acted swiftly to assert his rights.139 The majority and 
dissent both discuss the potential implications of this decision on the 
use of birth control in future cases, but it would have been more 
useful to analyze which party was responsible for Johns’s ignorance of 
his child’s existence. Moreover, both the majority and dissent 
overlooked another potential implication of this decision—that it 
fosters suspicion and distrust between current and former romantic 
partners. 
A. The Court’s Misplaced Focus on Birth Control 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions discuss birth control in 
some detail, but that focus, in this case, is misguided. What kind of 
birth control the parties did or did not use should not be the deciding 
factor in this case, and furthermore, the court’s focus on 
contraception necessitates confronting its potential implications in 
 
 135. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376. 
 136. Id. at 399, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 381. 
 138. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 376 (majority opinion). 
 139. Johns attempted to intervene in the adoption proceeding less than a month after 
finding out about the child. See id. at 388, 758 S.E.2d at 376. He also prepared a nursery in 
his home, In re S.D.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 38, 50 (2013), and expended 
considerable resources pursuing this case. See supra note 13. 
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future cases. The majority was compelled to clarify that its holding 
does not mean that the act of sex itself effectively puts a man on 
notice as to possibly having fathered a child140—one possible reading 
of this decision. The dissent also worried that the majority’s decision 
essentially requires men to use multiple forms of redundant birth 
control lest they be considered on notice of a potential pregnancy.141 
The dissent’s characterization of using multiple forms of birth 
control as redundant may be true in some cases, but it is not accurate 
in this case. Welker and Johns had two unplanned pregnancies in less 
than a year,142 so using additional birth control would not necessarily 
have been superfluous. Still, the court’s emphasis on birth control is 
unseemly in this case. Decisions relating to family, children, and 
contraception are both personal and private and should be free from 
governmental intrusion as much as possible.143 Even the most 
foolproof birth control methods fail on occasion.144 Moreover, 
romantic partners need to be able to trust one another since most 
forms of birth control are in the woman’s exclusive control and it 
would be unreasonable to require men to constantly supervise their 
partner’s use of contraception. 
In other cases with different facts, such as cases where 
reproductive coercion is alleged, it may be necessary to look into the 
birth control methods a couple used. In this case, however, the 
emphasis on birth control is unnecessary. Both parties were cavalier 
about contraception, but only Welker actively concealed the 
pregnancy and misidentified the child’s father.145 Determining 
whether Johns’s ignorance of his son’s existence was or was not within 
his control should not amount to speculating as to hypothetical 
scenarios where, had Johns done everything differently, he might 
have known about the pregnancy. Instead, the court should try to 
determine who held the control in such a situation and, consequently, 
who was responsible for Johns’s ignorance. 
That is not to say that Johns was a completely blameless party 
here. To an extent, the majority is correct when it accuses Johns of 
 
 140. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380. 
 141. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 142. See id. at 387, 758 S.E.2d at 375–76 (majority opinion). 
 143. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 144. See Effectiveness of Family Planning Methods, CDC,  http://www.cdc.gov
/reproductivehealth/UnintendedPregnancy/PDF/Contraceptive_methods_508.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E7YF-KEQ2].  
 145. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 383 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
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“incuriosity.”146 In a perfect world, couples would all take shared 
responsibility for contraception and be able to talk openly and 
honestly about what to do in the event of an unplanned pregnancy. 
Johns, though, was content to let Welker take responsibility for birth 
control and not insist on the use of condoms.147 However, Johns is 
hardly the first person to have taken a fast and loose approach to 
contraception, and Welker is just as responsible as Johns in that 
respect. 
B. The Court’s Failure To Consider the Parties’ Unequal Control 
In lieu of its in-depth examination of the parties’ use of birth 
control, the court should have devoted more attention to the question 
of who in this situation had the most control over the outcome. In this 
case, Johns was ignorant not because of his passivity, but because 
Welker actively worked against him, thus depriving him of any 
control over his relationship with his child. She knew that he was the 
father of her child.148 She knew where he lived and how to contact 
him.149 Based on their history, having already gone through an 
unplanned pregnancy, Johns had no reason to believe that Welker 
would not tell him about any other pregnancies.150 She held the 
knowledge and power in this situation, and not only did she fail to 
inform him of the pregnancy, but she actively worked against his 
constitutional interest in developing a relationship with his child.151 
Johns was at Welker’s mercy as to whether she would share this life-
altering information with him. Though Welker likely had the child’s 
best interest at heart, she was not entitled to unilaterally decide to 
place him for adoption when the father was neither unfit nor 
disinterested. 
Moreover, the tryst between Johns and Welker in November of 
2010152 proves that he was not as disinterested as the majority portrays 
him. It is difficult to reconcile that visit in November with the idea 
that Johns should have known about the pregnancy. That Welker 
could visit Johns less than two months after having given birth to their 
child and have sex with him, all without telling him about their child, 
is not something a reasonable person would have anticipated. 
 
 146. Id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion). 
 147. See id., 758 S.E.2d at 380–81. 
 148. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
 149. See id. at 398–99, 758 S.E.2d at 382. 
 150. See id. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382. 
 151. See id. at 395, 758 S.E.2d at 380 (majority opinion). 
 152. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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Besides, prior to November 2010, Johns and Welker had last seen 
each other in late February or early March. Since the average 
gestation period is forty weeks,153 their November rendezvous was 
well within the average gestation period, counting from late February 
or early March. Johns reasonably could have concluded from that 
November visit that Welker had not been pregnant. 
Though the dissent is concerned with the majority’s opinion 
effectively imposing a standard requiring all couples to use multiple 
forms of contraception,154 the majority opinion actually imposes a 
standard of extreme skepticism towards current and former romantic 
partners. Ruling that it was within Johns’ control to learn about his 
child means that a man’s responsibility to learn about the children he 
has fathered extends beyond just maintaining or establishing contact 
with his former lovers. Johns would have had to be in steady contact 
with Welker after their breakup, affirmatively asking her to confirm 
that she was not pregnant. It is unreasonable to expect anyone to 
keep in contact with any and all of his exes on the off chance that one 
might have become pregnant and failed to notify him of the 
pregnancy. It is even more unreasonable to expect a man to presume 
that a romantic partner would come to visit and even be intimate with 
him and still not tell him about a child he fathered. That level of 
skepticism is unreasonable and unhealthy, undermining trust in a 
relationship. 
Beyond encouraging an unhealthy level of skepticism, the court 
essentially gave Welker a free pass to behave badly. Arguably, 
Welker perjured herself by lying on the affidavit of parentage.155 
Furthermore, her misrepresentations and omissions resulted in Johns 
being deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to develop a 
relationship with his child. The majority admits that Welker’s 
behavior was troubling,156 but she faced no consequences for that 
troubling behavior and, in fact, received a verdict in her favor. There 
are many contexts in which safety concerns understandably motivate 
a mother not to identify her baby’s father.157 If a child’s father has a 
history of domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, or serious 
mental illness, to give a few examples, concealing his identity may 
 
 153. Pregnancy, OFF. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy
/you-are-pregnant/stages-of-pregnancy.html (last updated Sep. 27, 2010) [http://perma.cc
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 154. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. at 398, 758 S.E.2d at 382 (Jackson, J., 
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very well be the best and safest course of action. But in S.D.W. there 
was no evidence of such factors. In essence, the court tacitly approved 
of Welker’s deception and created an incentive for others who are 
similarly situated to do the same. Though Welker was in all likelihood 
attempting to provide a better life for her child by placing him for 
adoption, her desire should not have trumped Johns’s constitutional 
interest absent a showing of unfitness or of an informed disinterest in 
fathering.158 
C. Addressing the Best Interest Standard 
Of course, it is understandable why the court reached the 
decision it did. One of the overarching, fundamental goals of family 
law is to protect the best interests of the child.159 However, it is 
established law in North Carolina that the best interest of the child is 
subordinate to the paramount constitutional interest of a parent as 
against a nonparent, provided that the parent is fit and has not acted 
inconsistently with his or her protected right.160 Generally, the “best 
interest of the child” test is used in custody determinations between 
two natural parents161 who are similarly situated with regard to their 
constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of their 
children.162 However, in custody determinations between a natural 
parent and nonparents, the best interest standard can only be applied 
if the natural parent is unfit or has acted inconsistently with his or her 
constitutionally protected status as a parent.163 This is because there is 
a legal presumption that fit parents act in their child’s best interest.164 
 
 158. See David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 307, 608 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2005). 
 159. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 1 (2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf [http://perma
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 160. See Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 403–04, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905 (1994) (holding 
that “absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their 
children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and 
control of their children must prevail” and explicitly rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that 
“the welfare of the child is paramount to all common law preferential rights of the 
parents”). 
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App 422, 424, 232 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1977). 
 162. See Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534. 
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Parents’ constitutional interest in raising their children is so 
strong that they must only meet a minimum standard of care to be 
considered fit parents.165 If a parent meets this minimum standard, the 
best interest standard may then only be applied upon a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has acted inconsistently 
with his or her constitutionally protected status.166 Acting consistently 
with the constitutionally protected status is accomplished mainly 
through establishing a significant “custodial, personal, or financial 
relationship with [the child].”167 This support must be ongoing, so as 
the child ages, these responsibilities will necessarily become more 
substantial. However, when a child is very young, welcoming the child 
into a home and holding him out as a biological child is considered 
substantial.168 
In this case, Johns never had an opportunity to welcome his son 
into his home or take custody. Instead, the boy went to live with the 
Joneses two days after his birth, and by the time the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina ruled on this case, he was nearly four years old. It is 
easy to see why the court would be hesitant to remove a four-year old 
child from the only family he has ever known. Still, the constitutional 
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 167. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983). 
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rights of parents are paramount169 and must be protected, even in 
cases where the outcome is potentially heartrending. To do otherwise 
risks setting a precedent that could erode the potency of those 
constitutional rights in their application to future cases. Furthermore, 
if the length of time spent with the prospective adoptive family 
influences the decisions of courts, that creates an incentive for those 
in favor of the adoption moving forward to stall litigation as long as 
possible. That is, of course, assuming that the putative father has the 
resources to litigate. Johns incurred considerable expenses pursuing 
this case,170 but many putative fathers who find themselves in similar 
situations will likely not have the resources necessary to pursue their 
claims to the end and, as a result, may be unfairly cut out of their 
children’s lives. 
Courts should not routinely have to inquire as to the 
constitutionality of adoptions that have satisfied all the statutory 
requirements.171 Since it is not the place of the United States Supreme 
Court to dictate how a state will handle the details of adoptions 
taking place within its borders,172 the Court’s standard in Lehr 
articulates only the outer limits of what is acceptable under the 
Constitution.173 It’s difficult for a father to show the existence of 
circumstances beyond his control.174 Many things may be within a 
father’s control, but he may not realize the need to exert such control. 
While it is this Recent Development’s contention that the 
qualifications for notice were outside of Johns’s control, the majority 
saw it differently. A better-designed statutory scheme could 
contemplate and provide for these sorts of scenarios in the future, 
streamlining the adoption process and ensuring increased stability for 
children while also protecting the rights of putative fathers. 
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IV.  SUGGESTIONS FOR A WORKABLE STATUTORY SCHEME 
A. Policy Underpinnings of the Proposed Statutory Framework 
The North Carolina General Statutes are not designed to handle 
adoptions where a father may not have known about his child or was 
actively thwarted from developing a relationship with his child.175 The 
North Carolina General Assembly needs to implement a statutory 
scheme that would give meaningful protection to fathers’ 
constitutional rights while still safeguarding women and promoting 
the best interests of children. Therefore, the general assembly should 
consider adopting the Uniform Adoption Act—specifically its 
provisions governing consent and termination of the parent-child 
relationship.176 The Uniform Adoption Act was designed to protect 
the rights of birth parents while also expediting the adoption process 
and promoting family stability and the best interests of the child.177 In 
other words, the Uniform Adoption Act was designed specifically to 
prevent cases like S.D.W. where, under dubious circumstances, an 
otherwise-fit biological father was deprived of his right to parent his 
child. 
In order to properly address the issue of thwarted or unwitting 
fathers, one must consider what motivates a mother to hide her 
pregnancy or actively thwart the father from parenting his child. For 
example, in one survey, more than one-third of American women 
have reported experiencing stalking, physical violence, or rape at the 
hands of an intimate partner.178 In the same survey, 8.6% of women 
surveyed, representing an estimated 10.3 million women, have 
reported having an intimate partner who either refused to wear a 
condom or attempted to impregnate them against their wishes.179 
These shocking statistics demonstrate that reproductive coercion is a 
reality—one that occurs all too frequently. Given that violence may 
“begin or escalate during . . . pregnancy,”180 there is no doubt that 
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many women have valid, legitimate reasons for keeping their child’s 
biological father in the dark. For some women, hiding a pregnancy 
from a former or current partner could be the difference between life 
and death.181 So how should North Carolina go about protecting men 
like Johns while safeguarding women who have valid reasons for 
excluding a child’s father? The Uniform Adoption Act offers 
solutions to these problems and more. 
B. The Proposed Statutes’ Operation 
For the most part, North Carolina’s statute listing who must 
consent to an adoption tracks the Uniform Adoption Act’s analogous 
provision, with only a few variances.182 The first functional difference 
between the two is the timeframe during which a putative father can 
assert his rights. While North Carolina’s statutes require that a man 
legitimate the child or take on an obligation of support before the 
filing of the petition in order to withhold consent to an adoption,183 
the Uniform Adoption Act allows a putative father to intervene at 
any point while the petition to adopt is pending.184 The two diverge 
even further when it comes to the amount of focus each places on 
thwarted or unwitting fathers. Where North Carolina’s statutes fail to 
address the issue at all,185 the Uniform Adoption Act provides a step-
by-step mechanism for determining whether a parent has forfeited his 
constitutional interest in his child and, therefore, whether he may 
withhold consent to an adoption.186 
The Uniform Adoption Act requires only the consent of fathers 
who have “manifest[ed] parenting behavior[,]”187 with an exception 
for fathers who can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
a compelling reason for not having demonstrated such behavior.188 
 
 181. Cf. N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RELATED 
HOMICIDES OCCURRING IN 2013, at 4 (2013), http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/43e3cd15-65fb-
409a-a71d-726f3dc92bf8/2013-Report-on-Domestic-Violence-Related-Homicides.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/4FRS-UF6Q] (noting that in 2013, sixty-two women were murdered by an 
intimate partner in North Carolina alone).  
 182. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b) (2013) (stating that petitions for 
adoption may only be granted by consent of any man who may not be the biological father 
but was married or attempted to marry the mother when the child was born), with UNIF. 
ADOPTION ACT § 3-502 (1994) (stating that petitions for adoption may be filed by a 
parent whose spouse has filed a petition to adopt the child in question).  
 183. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3)–(5). 
 184. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-502(a). 
 185. See supra Section I.B. 
 186. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 cmt. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See § 3-504(d). 
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This exception is even further limited in order to weed out fathers 
who are otherwise unfit. For example, the statute explicitly excludes 
men who have been convicted of a violent crime or domestic violence 
offense that indicates that they would be unfit parents.189 It also 
excludes men whose parental rights could be terminated under state 
law,190 which in North Carolina amounts to men who have abused, 
abandoned, or neglected their children.191 This serves to protect 
women who have justifiable reasons for excluding their child’s father. 
For those who do not meet any of the statutory criteria listed 
above, proving a compelling reason for not having manifested 
parenting behavior is considerably easier than proving that 
circumstances were beyond one’s control. Many things may be within 
a person’s control but outside his or her responsibilities. However, 
these same factors might still be considered compelling reasons for 
not manifesting parenting behavior. Once a man has proven a 
compelling reason by a preponderance of the evidence, the court 
inquires as to the best interest of the child.192 If the court determines 
that it is not in the best interest of the child that the father’s parental 
rights be terminated, the inquiry ends there.193 His parental rights will 
not be terminated, and the adoption will not go forward. But where a 
man has demonstrated a compelling reason for not having stepped up 
as a father and termination of parental rights is in the child’s best 
interest, the inquiry continues. 
Where a man has demonstrated a compelling reason for not 
having taken responsibility as a parent, the adoption may still go 
forward without his consent if termination of his parental rights is in 
the child’s best interest and an additional listed factor is met194—
essentially creating a best interest of the child–plus standard. The 
additional factors justifying termination enumerated in the statute 
include an inability or unwillingness to promptly take over physical 
and legal custody of the child and pay for the child’s support,195 an 
inability or unwillingness to establish contact with the child and pay 
for his or her support in accordance with one’s means,196 and behaving 
 
 189. See § 3-504(c)(3). 
 190. See § 3-504(c)(5). 
 191. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(10) (2013). The statute also lists having 
fathered the child during the commission of a sexual offense as a ground for terminating 
parental rights. See § 7B-1111(a)(11). 
 192. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-504(d). 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. § 3-504(d)(1). 
 196. § 3-504(d)(2). 
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or having behaved in a way that demonstrates unfitness to parent or 
risks substantial harm to the child’s well-being.197 The additional 
factor requirement can also be met by showing that failing to 
terminate the parental relationship would result in detriment to the 
child.198 Determining what constitutes detriment to the child is guided 
by a catchall provision in the statute.199 This catchall provision gives 
judges discretion to consider the efforts the thwarted father made to 
establish a relationship with his child, the role the birth mother played 
in thwarting the father, and a number of other factors that may 
influence the child’s well-being.200 The compelling reason, best 
interest, and best interest of the child–plus standards utilized in the 
Uniform Adoption Act manage to balance at times competing 
interests: a biological father’s constitutionally protected interest in 
developing a relationship with his children and the best interest of the 
child. 
Adopting the provisions of consent and termination from the 
Uniform Adoption Act would also make it clear to the public what 
the controlling legal standard is. A well-defined standard is easier for 
courts to enforce through their decisions than is an intentionally 
vague constitutional standard. With detailed statutes in place and a 
clear framework to follow, courts would be more likely to produce 
results that did not stray into potentially unconstitutional territory. 
Courts would be tasked only with interpreting the statute and spared 
the additional constitutional analysis and the heightened potential for 
appeals that come with it. Furthermore, the answers in difficult cases 
like S.D.W. would be more easily ascertainable, thereby reducing the 
possibility of protracted litigation and, consequently, increasing 
stability for the children involved. 
Were North Carolina to adopt the Uniform Adoption Act’s 
provisions, the end result would be clearer decisions and fewer 
reversals. Expectations would be clear, children would be spared the 
pain of forming attachments to an adoptive family only to be sent 
 
 197. § 3-504(d)(3). 
 198. § 3-504(d)(4). 
 199. § 3-504(e). 
 200. See id. (“In making a determination under subsection (d)(4), the court shall 
consider any relevant factor, including the respondent’s efforts to obtain or maintain legal 
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the minor’s present custodial environment, and the effect of a change of physical custody 
on the minor.”). 
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back to a birth family, and adoptive parents’ pain would be mitigated 
as well. Furthermore, had the Uniform Adoption Act’s standards 
been adopted in North Carolina, S.D.W. almost certainly would have 
been decided differently. 
C. Application of the Uniform Adoption Act to S.D.W. 
Applying the Uniform Adoption Act’s provisions to the facts in 
S.D.W. provides a definitive answer to a close case. Had the Uniform 
Adoption Act’s termination of parental rights provisions been in 
place, instead of being tasked with proving that qualifications for 
notice were beyond his control, Johns only would have had to 
demonstrate a compelling reason for why he had not participated in 
his child’s life. Proving a compelling reason by a preponderance of the 
evidence is much easier than proving that the situation was beyond 
his control. Reasonable minds can—and did—disagree as to whether 
it was outside of Johns’s control to obtain knowledge of his child. But 
the court would be harder pressed to justify a ruling that Johns did 
not have a compelling reason for not becoming involved in his child’s 
life in light of Welker’s deception and misrepresentations. 
Once Johns had proven a compelling reason, the inquiry would 
then move to the child’s best interest. The court would be tasked with 
determining whether it would be in the best interest of the child for 
Johns’s parental rights to be terminated. Two days after the child was 
born, he was placed with the Joneses.201 A court very likely would 
choose the Joneses, two parents who wanted and planned for a child 
and went through a considerable amount of trouble to adopt, over 
Johns, a single parent who never intended to become a father. But 
even if it were in the child’s best interest to remain with the Joneses, 
Johns would still have had the right to withhold his consent to the 
adoption. Johns was prepared to promptly take over the child’s 
physical and legal custody and pay for his support, and there was no 
evidence that he was unfit, so he does not meet any of the additional 
statutory factors required for the termination of parental rights under 
the Uniform Adoption Act. His consent still would have been 
required.202 
In the end, had the Uniform Adoption Act been enacted in 
North Carolina, Johns likely would have won his case. He would have 
been entitled to stop the Joneses’ adoption and take on an active 
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parenting role instead. Though it is understandable that a judge might 
hesitate to remove a young child from the only home and family she 
has ever known, the alternative is to deny Johns his constitutional 
rights. Denying Johns the opportunity to exercise his constitutional 
rights potentially weakens the well-established legal principle that a 
parent has a constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of 
his children.203 Moreover, had the Uniform Adoption Act been in 
place, an appropriate legal judgment would have been more easily 
ascertainable. Litigation likely would not have lasted for more than 
three years as it did in S.D.W., since, under the Uniform Adoption 
Act, the court’s only task would have been to apply the clear and 
precise statute without having to wade into murky and vague 
constitutional territory. While it is a natural human instinct and an 
otherwise worthy goal to protect and promote children’s best 
interests, it is still the responsibility of the courts to uphold the 
Constitution, even when it produces unpalatable results. A better and 
more thorough statutory provision governing consent to adoption and 
termination of rights, such as the Uniform Adoption Act, would have 
balanced the competing interests articulated in Lehr while simplifying 
the analysis for the court and easing its burden. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a well-established principle that parents have a 
constitutional interest in the care, custody, and control of their 
children.204 However, “the mere existence of a biological link”205 does 
not necessarily merit constitutional protection when a father has 
failed to step up and take on the responsibilities that come with 
parenting.206 While it is clear that an absent or uninterested father 
should not be able to withhold his consent to an adoption, when the 
putative father was previously unaware of the child it is difficult to 
nail down the precise point where he has forfeited his constitutional 
right to develop a relationship with his child and when an adoption 
can proceed without his consent. 
When a child is placed for adoption, the state is forced to balance 
several competing interests—those of the birth parents, those of the 
adoptive parents, and those of the child. In S.D.W., the court allowed 
an adoption to become final without the consent of the child’s 
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biological father because learning of his child’s existence was deemed 
to be within his control.207 This Recent Development analyzed why 
the majority was wrong and how the father’s knowledge of his son 
and his entitlement to withhold consent were beyond his control.208 
Moreover, Johns’s case has the potential for broad implications in 
future adoptions, with the majority opinion effectively requiring an 
unreasonably high level of skepticism between men and their 
romantic partners in order to safeguard his constitutional rights. 
Difficult cases like S.D.W. could be made easier for the courts if the 
North Carolina General Assembly were to enact further adoption 
legislation addressing the issue of fathers who are unaware of their 
children or have been otherwise thwarted from developing a 
relationship with them. As they stand now, North Carolina’s adoption 
laws are woefully inadequate, failing to provide meaningful guidance. 
By contrast, the Uniform Adoption Act contemplates thwarted 
and unwitting fathers and provides a mechanism for balancing their 
rights against the best interest of the child, while also taking into 
account the real and legitimate reasons a woman might have for 
hiding a pregnancy or preventing a father from developing a 
relationship with his child. North Carolina would do well to adopt 
these provisions. Had they been in place, the outcome in S.D.W. 
would have been different. As marriage becomes less prevalent and 
unconventional family arrangements more the norm, courts will be 
forced to confront more cases like S.D.W. The North Carolina 
General Assembly should take action and enact statutes, like the 
Uniform Adoption Act, that will protect the constitutional rights of 
fathers within the state while still promoting the child’s interests. 
Until such time, it is the responsibility of the courts to uphold the 
Constitution, even when it produces unpopular results. 
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